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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 18-1832 
____________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER JOHN KALISZ, 
Appellant 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No.:  5-17-cr-00345-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.  
      
 
(Opinion filed April 3, 2019) 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, SCIRICA and RENDELL Circuit Judges 
 ___________ 
O P I N I O N* 
___________ 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Appellant, Christopher John Kalisz, pled guilty to failing to register as a sex 
offender.  He was sentenced to sixteen months in prison followed by five years of 
                                                          
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.   
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supervised release.  On appeal, Kalisz argues that his sentence was procedurally 
unreasonable.  Finding no error, we will affirm the District Court’s sentencing order.   
I. 
  Kalisz pled guilty to forcible touching in New York, a conviction that required 
him to register as a sex offender.  While still in New York, he was charged with failing to 
register three times.  Kalisz pled guilty to the first two offenses, with one resulting in a 
six month prison sentence, and the third offense was still pending at the time of the 
District Court’s ruling. 
 An employment agency in Allentown, PA notified the U.S. Marshals Service that 
Kalisz, who was an employee, may be an unregistered sex offender.  The agency reported 
that he had listed a Pennsylvania home address on his employment application.  After an 
investigation, the Marshals Service determined that Kalisz had left New York, moved to 
Pennsylvania, and obtained a Pennsylvania driver’s license.  Through the Pennsylvania 
State Police, the Marshals Service also discovered that Kalisz had never registered as a 
sex offender in Pennsylvania, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).  U.S. Marshals arrested 
Kalisz, and he pled guilty to violating that statute. 
 The District Court determined the guideline sentencing range for Kalisz to be ten 
to sixteen months, which was based on an offense level of ten and a criminal history 
category of three.  Kalisz requested a downward variance for his sentence because, he 
argued, his major depressive disorder contributed to his failing to register as a sex 
offender.  Before sentencing, the District Court ordered a psychiatric, psychological, and 
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substance abuse evaluation of Kalisz.  Dr. Jeffrey E. Summerton performed the 
evaluation and reported his findings to the Court, confirming Kalisz’s diagnosis of major 
depressive disorder. 
 After hearing the parties’ arguments and considering Dr. Summerton’s report, the 
District Court denied Kalisz’s request for a downward variance and sentenced Kalisz to 
sixteen months in prison with a supervised release period of five years.  Although it 
recognized Kalisz’s diagnosis of major depressive disorder, the Court found the record 
did not “show that this disorder caused [Kalisz] to be unable to comply with [his] 
registration requirements.”  A. 77.  In doing so, the Court stated:  
[T]here’s no evidence or opinion testimony from [Kalisz’s] treating 
physician or mental health professionals that suggests that [his] conduct in 
failing to register is a product of that depression, and without that kind of 
evidence I have only mere allegations that [Kalisz’s] mental health 
treatment explains [his] conduct, but allegations alone don’t justify the 
variance that [Kalisz is] requesting.  
 Id.  Further, the District Court found that the nature of the offense and Kalisz’s prior 
history of failing to comply with his legal obligations “justif[ied] a substantial sentence.”  
A. 77.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review procedural errors in district court 
sentencings for abuse of discretion.  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).  
Our review “is limited to determining whether [the sentencing orders] are reasonable.”  
Id.   
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III. 
On appeal, Kalisz urges that the sentencing order issued by the District Court is 
procedurally unreasonable because the District Court failed to address the defense’s 
arguments during the sentencing proceedings.  Specifically, he argues: first, the District 
Court ignored the argument that Kalisz’s depression is relevant to understanding his 
history, characteristics, and prior record; second, the District Court misconstrued the 
argument that Kalisz’s depression and alcohol abuse contributed to the current offense; 
and third, the District Court erred in concluding that the defense’s arguments regarding 
Kalisz’s depression and alcohol abuse were “mere allegations.” 
We have instructed district courts to follow a three-step process at sentencing.  See 
United States v. Fisher, 502 F.3d 293, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006)).  They must (1) calculate the applicable 
Guidelines range; (2) rule on all motions for a departure, with an explanation of how the 
granted departure affects the calculation; and (3), after allowing for party argument, 
consider all §3553(a) factors and determine an appropriate sentence, which may vary 
upwards or downwards from the Guidelines range.  See id. at 308.  When reviewing 
whether a district court properly conducted the third step, “we apply a deferential 
standard, the trial court being in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence in 
light of the particular circumstances of the case.”  United States v. Hankerson, 496 F.3d 
303, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006)).  In order for a district court’s sentence to be 
deemed procedurally reasonable, the record must show that the district court 
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meaningfully considered the § 3553(a) factors; however, it does not need to make explicit 
findings on every individual factor as long as the record reflects that the district court 
considered all of them.  See United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Moreover, the district court only needs to set forth enough to show it “‘has considered the 
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decision 
making authority.’”  Id. (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).  The 
district court need not consider clearly meritless arguments.  See id.  Lastly, the party 
challenging the sentence “has the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.”  United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).       
We disagree with Kalisz’s first claim that the District Court ignored his argument 
that his depression is relevant to understanding his history, characteristics, and prior 
record.  The District Court acknowledged Kalisz’s history of depression, diagnosis of 
major depressive disorder, and Dr. Summerton’s report.  However, the District Court 
found that Kalisz did not present evidence or opinion testimony that showed how his 
depression was relevant to his conduct.  Instead, the Court noted Kalisz’s previous 
“failure[s] to comply with [his] legal obligations,” including his repeated failures to 
register in New York and his failed compliance with “the conditions of [his] supervised 
release.”  A. 77–78.  The Court determined “[Kalisz’s] conduct suggest[ed] a persistent 
disregard for [his] legal obligations.”  A. 78.  As mentioned above, a district court only 
needs to show it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for its 
decision.  Here, the District Court showed it considered the relevance of Kalisz’s 
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depression in regard to his history, characteristics, and prior record and had a reasoned 
basis for denying Kalisz’s variance request.    
We also disagree with Kalisz’s claim that the District Court misconstrued his 
argument that his depression and alcohol abuse contributed to the current offense.  
Kalisz’s argument below was simple:  Kalisz deserved leniency because his depression 
and alcoholism contributed to a spiraling failure to meet many obligations, including 
those underlying this prosecution.  The District Court acknowledged Kalisz’s diagnosis 
of major depressive disorder and his positive response to recent treatment and found it 
did not justify a variance.  The District Court also considered Kalisz’s alcohol problems 
and included requirements that he refrain from alcohol and participate in an alcohol 
treatment program as part of his sentence.  Thus, the District Court did not misconstrue 
Kalisz’s argument. 
Finally, we disagree with Kalisz’s claim that the District Court erred by 
concluding that his arguments were “mere allegations.”  We recognize that Kalisz’s 
counsel made an argument that Kalisz’s major depressive disorder and alcohol abuse 
contributed to his failure to register; however, Dr. Summerton’s report merely describes 
those problems and lists recommended treatment options.  The report does not make any 
specific findings that they caused or contributed to his failure to register.  Because the 
record does not contain support for Kalisz’s assertions, the District Court acted 
reasonably when describing his arguments as “mere allegations.” 
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IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentencing order of the District 
Court. 
